Money does not appear to be Iran’s primary objective, or even its most important one. The more consequential question is whether the outcome of the war leaves Tehran with a durable political and institutional role in shaping how one of the world’s most strategically important waterways is governed,

The Strait of Hormuz

Recent reporting by The New York Times and Reuters suggests the contours of that arrangement are beginning to emerge. While details remain disputed, the broad direction is striking. According to Reuters, Iran is seeking full authority over inbound shipping, visibility over outbound traffic, and the ability to intervene when necessary. The New York Times similarly reports that inbound traffic would use a channel under Iranian control while outbound traffic would transit near Oman. Iranian officials continue to deny they are seeking tolls, insisting instead that any fees would compensate for maritime services, environmental protection, and security. American officials dispute aspects of those accounts, underscoring that negotiations remain fluid. Taken together, the reporting suggests these talks are evolving into something larger than a technical agreement to resume shipping. Iranian officials describe them as negotiations over the postwar governance of the Strait, while insisting that reopening Hormuz itself will remain a separate matter contingent on broader U.S.-Iran negotiations. Meanwhile, U.S. officials appear willing to treat such an arrangement as the price of reopening Hormuz.

That distinction is easy to overlook because most outside proposals still begin from the assumption that the objective is restoring freedom of navigation as quickly as possible. Some envision modest maritime service fees. Others propose multinational governance arrangements modeled on the Strait of Malacca or other international waterways. These are thoughtful attempts to reconcile competing interests, but they may not fully capture what Iranian officials themselves describe as the purpose of these negotiations.

The clearest indication comes from recent statements by senior Iranian officials. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi argued that the prewar Traffic Separation Scheme was no longer acceptable because it left Tehran with insufficient oversight over commercial vessels entering and leaving the Persian Gulf. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei later echoed the same principle in more cautious diplomatic language, explaining that Iran and Oman are negotiating entirely new inbound and outbound shipping lanes rather than restoring either the previous northern or southern routes. He emphasized that the purpose is to safeguard the sovereign rights and national security of both countries and that these talks remain separate from the broader question of reopening the Strait itself.

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei

Taken together, these statements point toward something considerably more ambitious than collecting fees. They suggest Iran is attempting to convert the leverage it acquired during the war into a durable feature of the postwar regional order.

That distinction matters because wartime leverage is inherently temporary. It depends on military capabilities, the willingness to continue fighting, and the constant threat of renewed disruption. Institutionalized leverage survives after the shooting stops. If the routing of commercial traffic, maritime services, and the oversight of inbound and outbound shipping are reorganized in ways that give Iran an enduring role in managing traffic through Hormuz, Tehran would preserve much of its strategic influence without relying on continual military coercion.

Seen through this lens, Iranian references to sovereignty are less about claiming ownership over an international waterway than about ensuring that the political architecture governing Hormuz no longer reflects the prewar status quo. The objective is not necessarily unilateral control. Rather, it is to institutionalize a governance arrangement that recognizes Iran as an indispensable participant in overseeing maritime traffic and embeds that role in durable rules rather than temporary wartime realities.

This also helps explain why proposals centered primarily on modest transit fees or shared regional administration may not fully address Tehran’s publicly stated objectives. If revenue were the principal goal, sanctions relief and unrestricted oil exports would provide economic gains likely exceeding anything realistically obtainable through maritime fees. Instead, Iranian officials have consistently emphasized routing, oversight, maritime administration, sovereign rights, and security. Those are questions of political authority, not simply economics.

That creates a fundamental tension for Washington. The Trump administration urgently wants commercial shipping to resume because the economic and political costs of prolonged disruption continue to mount. Yet the more the negotiations move toward recognizing a lasting Iranian role in administering maritime traffic through Hormuz, the harder it becomes for Washington to argue that the war restored the regional order it originally set out to defend. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has framed the issue as preserving freedom of navigation and preventing any precedent that allows states to control international waterways. Tehran increasingly frames it as correcting what it sees as an outdated governance arrangement that failed to reflect Iran’s security interests and strategic position after the war.

Whether such an agreement ultimately emerges remains uncertain, and American and Iranian accounts of the negotiations continue to diverge. But one thing is becoming increasingly clear. The central question is no longer simply whether Hormuz will reopen. It is who will exercise lasting authority over the rules governing maritime traffic once it does. If recent Iranian statements are taken seriously, Tehran is negotiating not merely for economic compensation, but for an institutional role that preserves its wartime leverage long after the war itself has ended.

The reversal immediately raises an obvious question. Are we witnessing another “Islamabad moment” from Trump?

The closing days of the nearly forty day U.S. war against Iran from February to April followed a similar trajectory. Trump steadily escalated his rhetoric, culminating in his extraordinary threat to destroy Iranian civilization. Yet instead of following through, he accepted a ceasefire on terms mediated by Pakistan and entered negotiations that ultimately produced the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

At the time, the agreement was widely viewed as favoring Iran. It envisioned not only a ceasefire, but a framework for ending the war on a regional basis while providing Iran with immediate and tangible economic relief. Those included ending the war in Lebanon, releasing frozen Iranian assets, allowing Iran to establish “arrangements” governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz, and permitting Iranian oil exports under a U.S. waiver.

Yet, none of those provisions were meaningfully implemented.

Instead, Washington sought to minimize the practical concessions it had made. Rather than accepting Iran’s new leverage over Hormuz, the United States attempted to create an alternative U.S.-backed maritime corridor hugging the Omani coast that commercial shipping could use without complying with Iranian arrangements. Iran responded by insisting that vessels use its designated route and by targeting ships that attempted to transit the southern corridor. A familiar cycle quickly emerged. The United States bombed southern Iran. Iran retaliated with missile and drone strikes against U.S. facilities and regional partners, initially concentrating on Kuwait and Bahrain before expanding the campaign to Jordan, Qatar, Oman, and elsewhere. By mid-July, the memorandum had effectively unraveled and the war had entered a new phase.

That new phase has been fundamentally different from the first.

The original American war sought far more ambitious objectives. Trump openly spoke about changing Iran’s “map,” called on Iranian soldiers to lay down their arms, declared that he would choose Iran’s future leadership, and regularly talked about seizing Iran’s oil. The military campaign reflected those ambitions. Police stations, security checkpoints, government institutions, and leadership targets were struck alongside military facilities. Israeli and American bombing also focused heavily on western Iran in what Israeli and U.S. media reported was intended, at least in part, to create space for Kurdish armed groups based in Iraq to invade western Iran.

None of those objectives were achieved. Instead, they backfired spectacularly. The war that began with ambitions of reshaping Iran became a struggle to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

That shift is extraordinary. Today, Washington is trying to solve a problem that did not exist before the war: the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz (and the Bab al-Mandeb as of late). It is also trying to secure a nuclear agreement that, according to multiple accounts, including Omani officials and Britain’s National Security Adviser, was already within reach before the war began. Having overplayed its hand in pursuit of total Iranian capitulation and/or regime change, Washington now finds itself seeking many of the same diplomatic outcomes from a significantly weaker strategic position.

Indeed, the military balance has drastically changed. CENTCOM says the United States conducted more than 13,000 airstrikes during the February to April phase of the war, not including Israeli operations. Many more followed after the ceasefire collapsed. Yet Iran’s core asymmetric capabilities, its ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, underground facilities, naval assets, and ability to project force across the region remain intact. Judging from recent weeks, Iran continues to strike with precision against U.S. positions as far away as Jordan while commercial shipping through the southern route in Hormuz remains deeply vulnerable despite repeated American bombings.

This illustrates a broader lesson about the limits of airpower. Air campaigns can destroy infrastructure and eliminate fixed targets, but they are far less effective at dismantling dispersed and mobile forces, underground bases, or compelling political outcomes. If anything, by all accounts, the United States is now deeply mired in the practical constraints of a prolonged air campaign. Interceptor inventories have been heavily depleted, and the rapid consumption of precision-guided munitions has become a growing concern inside the administration. Recent reporting indicates that Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine has warned about dwindling interceptor stocks, mounting logistical pressures, and the strain an extended air campaign is placing on broader U.S. military readiness.

That is why the initiative increasingly appears to be shifting in favor of Iran.

After Washington paused its attacks last week, Iran briefly did the same. It then resumed the fighting on its own terms, launching a preemptive strike against U.S. forces in Jordan before continuing attacks on targets in Bahrain and Kuwait while commercial shipping through the southern Hormuz corridor remained under pressure. Trump has responded not with the massive escalation many expected, but with another diplomatic opening.

Iran’s strategy is increasingly clear. It is not trying to defeat the United States militarily. It is trying to make prolonged confrontation economically and politically unsustainable. Every additional week of disruption raises costs for global energy markets while continuing to drain American interceptor inventories and offensive munitions. It increases political pressure on Trump as fuel prices rise and an already deeply unpopular war moves closer to the midterm elections. At the same time, repeated strikes against U.S. bases seek to make America’s regional military posture more costly and less sustainable while convincing Gulf states that their security cannot be separated from Iran’s own security.

This is ultimately a struggle over the future regional order. Tehran is attempting to demonstrate that efforts to isolate or militarily coerce Iran will not produce regional stability, but regional insecurity. More fundamentally, it is trying to convince the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies that the decades-old American security umbrella has become conditional and costly. If Washington cannot shield its closest regional partners from sustained retaliation while pursuing confrontation with Iran, then the premise underlying the region’s security architecture begins to erode. Iran’s message is that Persian Gulf security cannot be achieved against Iran, only with Iran. Rather than accepting a regional order built on American military primacy and Iran’s isolation, Tehran is seeking one that recognizes Iran as an indispensable security actor whose interests cannot be ignored. That message appears to be resonating. The Persian Gulf Arab monarchies have become noticeably more cautious about further escalation, and reports suggest Saudi Arabia has repeatedly urged restraint during this latest crisis.

Trump now faces the same choice he confronted in April. He can accept that the era of maximalist ambitions is over and negotiate from the world as it is, not as he hoped it would become. Or he can double down through infrastructure warfare or even contemplate a ground invasion that would almost certainly deepen America’s strategic predicament while delaying, and raising the price of, the diplomacy that remains inevitable.

The greatest lesson of this war may not be about Iran at all. It may be about the changing character of modern warfare. The United States has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for destruction. What it has not demonstrated is an equal ability to translate that destruction into durable strategic outcomes. That is a lesson Washington will likely confront not only in Iran, but in every future conflict where geography, precision weapons, and political resilience increasingly constrain the utility of overwhelming air power.

It’s been a while since I’ve sent a post, and I wanted to start by saying thank you for sticking around.

Over the past few months, I’ve been much more active on X than on Substack as the Iran war unfolded. Between publishing real-time analysis, writing articles and reports, closely tracking developments, appearing in the media, and responding to a rapidly evolving situation, I simply haven’t had the time to give this newsletter the attention it deserves.

That said, I wanted to share some of the work I’ve been doing and let you know that I plan to return to Substack with much more regular analysis in the days and weeks ahead.

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My biggest project over the past several months has been completing a major report for the Center for International Policy, produced with support from the Ploughshares Fund and Horizon 2045, which I’m excited to finally share with you at the following link:

Beyond Maximalism: Reimagining U.S. Strategy Toward Iran Through Systems Thinking

The report examines four decades of U.S.-Iran relations to identify the recurring patterns that have repeatedly undermined diplomacy and fueled cycles of escalation. Its central argument is that the current catastrophe was not inevitable. The report shows how hubris, groupthink, and repeated reliance on coercion helped produce the very outcomes Washington sought to prevent. It concludes by outlining a different strategy grounded in strategic realism, reciprocal diplomacy, and long-term risk reduction.

To bring these ideas to broader audiences, I also wrote two essays based on the report’s core arguments. The first, published in The American Conservative, argues that America’s decades-long conflict with Iran has been defined by a persistent overreliance on coercion and a fundamental misunderstanding of how Tehran perceives its security interests. Rather than producing a weaker or more accommodating Iran, these policies have repeatedly strengthened the very dynamics Washington sought to reverse.

The second essay, co-authored with Nancy Okail and published in The Nation, argues that Trump’s Iran policy reflects a deeper institutional failure rather than simply one president’s decisions. We examine how weak accountability, limited oversight, and a persistent inability to learn from past failures have allowed militaristic strategies to be recycled despite repeatedly falling short of their objectives.

Beyond writing, I’ve also had the opportunity to bring my analysis to a broader public audience through television interviews and media appearances. Most recently, I joined Al Jazeera English for two discussions on the evolving Iran war and the prospects for diplomacy.

Across the two interviews (Link 1, Link 2), I discussed the strategic deadlock facing the Trump administration, why military pressure is unlikely to produce a lasting political outcomes, and the growing economic and geopolitical costs of continued escalation. I also emphasized the need to rebuild U.S. credibility through serious diplomacy rather than tactical pauses, and why the underlying drivers of the conflict remain unresolved the current lull in fighting.

I look forward to sharing more regular analysis here again soon, and as always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

He also highlights the central role of public mobilization, reiterates that Iran’s negotiating positions remain aligned with the Supreme Leader, and signals that tools like the Strait of Hormuz remain in reserve as leverage.

Taken together, the address offers a revealing window into how Iran’s leadership is framing both the war’s outcome and the path ahead.

Below is the full English translated transcript of his remarks:

Firstly, I offer greetings and respect to all the dear and noble nation of Iran—an aware, insightful, and brave nation.

I offer congratulations and condolences to all the families who have lost their loved ones, their children, their spouses, their friends—and in one sense, have gained them.

I express my sympathy with them, and I ask the Great God that we behave and act in such a way that we are not indebted to these dear and proud people.

I am grateful to the Great God for the opportunity to speak with our dear people today, though it certainly would have been better to speak with our dear people sooner;

however, work preoccupations and work pressure rarely gave me this opportunity.

Because I always believe that knowing and being informed is the definitive right of the people, and naturally, especially in these conditions, it is our duty.

[Interviewer]:

One of your main questions in the two previous sessions when you spoke was regarding the war—a descriptive-operational account of the state of the war and the victories we had, the points that existed, the concerns.

Currently, how do you see the state of the war and Iran’s position?

Is the upper hand with the Islamic Republic, or is the American position placed higher?

[Ghalibaf]:

Well, look, the start of the war was a continuation of that same bullying and mistrust that existed with America.

Again, you saw that in the middle of negotiations they made this move.

That time, they came and martyred our commanders.

This time, at the start of their work, they came and martyred our martyred Imam [Leader].

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This line from Iranian academic Saeed Ajorloo captures the essence of Tehran’s position in this war and the logic behind what it is seeking in any negotiated outcome.

Over a month into a war launched by Trump and Netanyahu, Iran has remained firm in rejecting the terms put forward by the Trump administration. Instead, it has advanced its own counterproposals, aimed not at a temporary ceasefire but at a permanent end to the conflict, while using its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz to secure lasting security and economic gains.

The backdrop to all of this is of course a total collapse of trust. Iran has now faced two surprise attacks by the United States and Israel in less than a year, both occurring in the context of ongoing negotiations.

More broadly, since Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal, the United States has pursued a “maximum pressure” campaign, imposing severe sanctions while advancing maximalist demands that Iran dismantle its nuclear program, give up its missile capabilities, and abandon its regional allies. In effect, Iran is being asked to disarm and fundamentally weaken its ability to defend itself against future attack.

Trump has maintained these demands throughout, including in the negotiations leading up to this war, when by many accounts a deal stronger than the 2015 agreement was within reach but did not amount to the kind of capitulation he sought, and in the reported 15-point U.S. proposal transmitted via Pakistan during the war.

Yet this war has not gone Trump’s way. Rather than bringing about the collapse of the Iranian government, or even consequentially degrading its ability to respond, Iran has continued to strike back with drones and missiles, hitting critical regional infrastructure as well as U.S. assets and bases. Most importantly, it has maintained an effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

It is this final piece of leverage that has fundamentally shifted the strategic equation in Iran’s favor. By restricting the flow of hydrocarbons out of a region that supplies a substantial share of global oil and gas, as well as other critical commodities such as fertilizers, Iran has created real pressure on the U.S. and the global economy. It is seeking to use this leverage to secure a favorable settlement, and is highly unlikely to relinquish it, even if Trump follows through on his threats to “blow up the country.”

Those threats have hung over the war for weeks, with attention fixated on Trump’s rolling deadlines for attacking Iran’s power plants and energy infrastructure.

On Sunday, Trump escalated the rhetoric further:

“The entire country could be taken out in one night, and that night might be tomorrow night.”

He followed with a firm deadline of 8 p.m. Tuesday, and added:

“Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!!”

But this framing obscures a key reality. The war has already crossed that threshold.

Since March 27, the United States has been systematically targeting Iran’s civilian and strategic infrastructure. Under the cover of deadlines and high-profile threats, these attacks have become normalized, receding into the background of the war.

A wide range of critical facilities have been hit, including major steel production centers, the Pasteur Institute, one of Iran’s oldest medical and pharmaceutical institutions, the B1 Bridge in Karaj, advanced research hubs at Shahid Beheshti University, the National AI Platform at Sharif University of Technology, and petrochemical complexes in Assaluyeh and Mahshahr.

These are not marginal targets. They are core pillars of Iran’s economy, scientific capacity, and long-term development.

They employ tens, and in some cases hundreds of thousands of people. Their disruption will ripple across the lives of roughly 90 million Iranians.

In other words, the infrastructure war is not looming. It is already underway.

But what does this mean if Iran is still not capitulating? It means Tehran is unlikely to give ground on its core interests, above all its control over the Strait of Hormuz, no matter the cost.

This is its most powerful source of leverage, and one for which there is no clear military solution. If anything, the more Iran’s infrastructure is targeted, the more valuable this leverage becomes.

Iran will seek to use it not only to shape the outcome of this war, but to secure its economic future after it, through tolls, transit control, and bilateral arrangements with countries that have until now largely complied with U.S. sanctions.

Trump now finds himself in a strategic deadlock. Early in the war, he spoke openly about shaping Iran’s future leadership, reflecting a belief that the conflict could lead to regime change.

Even short of that, the expectation appears to have been that initial strikes would weaken the Islamic Republic enough to strip it of the ability to mount a meaningful response or follow through on its threats.

None of that has happened. Instead, the objectives of the war have visibly narrowed. As even Pakistan’s defense minister recently noted, the goalposts have shifted from toppling Iran’s political system to simply reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

Trump now faces a narrowing set of options, none of them good. The war could end without reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a costly outcome that would underscore the failure of his objectives, carry political consequences at home, and mark a strategic setback for the United States on the global stage.

It could drag on in its current form of attacks on critical infrastructure, despite his clear preference for a short war, with the expanding energy conflict imposing escalating costs on the U.S. and the global economy.

Or he could escalate into ground operations, such as targeting key islands like Kharg, a move that risks heavy U.S. casualties and would be very likely to deepen the deadlock.

Meanwhile, a comprehensive diplomatic settlement remains the least likely outcome. Even partial concessions, such as allowing Iran to resume oil sales, may not suffice if Tehran is focused on establishing a new strategic and legal order over the Strait itself.

In this context, a cornered Trump becomes more dangerous, with escalation becoming the default tool to break a stalemate, even if it means intensifying attacks on Iran’s infrastructure while the Strait remains closed.

Whether Iran’s threats to widen the conflict, including targeting regional energy infrastructure and key chokepoints, can deter such a move remains uncertain as Trump’s Tuesday deadline approaches.

Iran, for its part, continues to sustain and even intensify its response, launching missiles and drones across the region and firing one of its largest salvos yet at Israel yet on April 1.

That reality tells us something important. After more than a month of intense U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, Iran’s core means of fighting back remain intact.

In this context, what we are seeing from the U.S. and Israel is a shift from counterforce targeting, aimed at degrading military assets (as they have failed to eliminate them), toward countervalue targeting, which focuses on civilian infrastructure and economic capacity. The logic is to increase pressure on Iran’s leadership by raising the cost across society as a whole.

The central question is this: why is Iran not backing down despite mounting pressure and escalating costs? The answer is that Iran does not believe it can safely do so. From Tehran’s perspective, conceding without securing its core interests risks long term weakening and would leave the country on a path to collapse anyway.

To understand why, this war has to be seen as the continuation of a strategy that dates back to Trump’s first term.

After withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal, which had successfully constrained Iran’s nuclear program, Trump pursued what he called “maximum pressure” policy against Iran starting in 2018. The goal was not limited concessions. It was full-on capitulation.

The demands reflected that ambition. Iran was expected to give up uranium enrichment, dismantle its ballistic missile program, and abandon its regional alliances. For Iran, this amounted to giving up the core tools it uses to deter attack and defend itself. In Tehran’s view, accepting those terms would leave the country completely exposed, much like Libya after it gave up its nuclear program, a move that was later followed by U.S. and European military attack in 2011 that helped bring about the collapse of the Libyan state (with the country mired in civil war to this day).

Iran has consistently rejected these maximalist demands, even as it continued to engage in negotiations. Those talks were twice interrupted by surprise attacks, first in June 2025 and again in February 2026. According to reports, in the latest round just before this war, Iran was willing to go beyond the 2015 deal by accepting stricter limits on enrichment, including permanent constraints, and even accepted proposals to internationalize parts of its nuclear program. Yet even that was not enough. Trump instead wanted total Iranian capitulation.

Trump’s “strategy” rested on a core assumption that Iran had been weakened to the point of total vulnerability, essentially reduced to a paper tiger, and that sustained pressure backed by military force would compel collapse or surrender.

The war has now definitively shown how deeply flawed that assumption was.

Instead, Iran has responded by expanding the conflict across the region. It has targeted US and Israeli assets across the region, struck infrastructure linked to US operations, and disrupted energy flows by closing the Strait of Hormuz. Despite weeks of severe bombardment, Iran has remained cohesive politically and maintained its rate of missile and drone attacks.

The result is a clear deadlock in the war. The United States is escalating, while Iran is not backing down. Washington insists negotiations are underway. Tehran insists they are not.

To understand why, you have to look at how Iran sees this war.

Inside Iran, the dominant view is that this war is the culmination of a longer campaign that began in 2018. What Iranian analysts often describe is a gradual strategy of pressure that includes sanctions, sabotage, assassinations, and periodic strikes. Taken together, they see this as an attempt to weaken and collapse the state over time.

In other words, they believe they have been facing a sustained strategy of attrition, a kind of death by a thousand cuts.

In that context, calls for negotiation are not viewed as off ramps by themselves. They are seen as efforts to freeze the conflict after failing to achieve a decisive outcome, just like happened after the 12-day War in June.

For Iran, a ceasefire at this juncture without clear guarantees is not seen as stabilizing. It is seen as accelerating a process that could lead to deeper instability or even fragmentation after the war, i.e. getting destroyed anyways.

Put plainly, this is an existential war for Iran.

This logic leads to a very different strategy than what many in Washington assume.

Iran is not hoping to win a conventional military victory. It is trying to deny its adversaries a decisive one.

The way it is doing this reflects a coherent strategy. It is absorbing major blows. And it widening the conflict into areas where the United States cannot fully control the outcome. The Strait of Hormuz closure and its impact on energy markets and shipping routes are central to this. So is the decision to treat Persian Gulf Arab states as extensions of US power, since American forces operate from their territory.

At the same time, Iranian analysts do expect the war to end in negotiation. But not under a pattern of fighting, pausing, and then returning to conflict.

What Iran is seeking is a fundamentally different outcome. It wants a real economic horizon after the war, including access to its frozen assets and meaningful sanctions relief. It wants an end to coordinated military pressure on itself and its regional allies. And it wants credible guarantees that the cycle will not simply repeat.

There are also clear red lines. Iran is not willing to dismantle its core deterrent capabilities or accept a deal that leaves it weaker in the next round of confrontation.

All of this is reinforced by internal political shifts. The assassination of more pragmatic figures such as Ali Larijani, and his replacement by a hardliner like Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, point to a consolidation of power around Mojtaba Khamenei’s circle. This is also reflected in the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards under Ahmad Vahidi, another figure closely aligned with that camp. As a result of the war, power has become more concentrated and more firmly anchored in the hardline security establishment. These actors have long been skeptical of compromise and are more inclined to approach the conflict in long term strategic terms.

The result is a system that is less flexible but more cohesive in its outlook.

From the outside, this can look like stubbornness or escalation for its own sake. From inside Iran, it follows a clear logic. If Iran backs down without securing its core interests, it will end up facing more destruction anyways.

That is why escalation has not produced capitulation. It is also why it is unlikely to do so going forward.

Iran’s threats to strike regional energy infrastructure if its own facilities come under attack are credible, as are its threats to counter escalate more broadly. From Tehran’s perspective, if it faces the prospect of being greatly weakened or destroyed regardless, it has no reason to hold back.

From there, the protests spilled into surrounding streets of the capital and, over subsequent days, into other cities across the country. As they spread, economic grievances increasingly mixed with overt anti-government slogans, as seen in past protest movements.

How should we evaluate the political significance of these protests, and their potential to produce transformational change?

Decades of protest cycles under the Islamic Republic suggest three core variables matter most:

1. Geographic spread: how widely protests extend across the country

2. Social composition: who is participating, i.e. merchants, workers, the middle class, students, labor unions, ethnic minorities.

3. Elite and security defections: whether cracks appear within governing or security institutions

Looking at past movements through this lens helps clarify both the possibilities and limits of the current moment.

The largest protest movement Iran has seen under the Islamic Republic remains the 2009 Green Movement, following the contested reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Backed by reformist presidential candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the movement mobilized enormous numbers. At one point, upwards of three million people filled the streets of Tehran.

The Green Movement protests endured for months and had recognizable leadership, but were concentrated largely in major urban centers and among the middle class.

Ultimately, the movement was repressed and fizzled out, with its leaders placed under house arrest, but it stands out for the sheer scale of mobilization.

The next major rupture came with the winter 2017–2018 protests, driven by economic grievances. These demonstrations drew far smaller crowds than 2009 but spread across a wider geographic area, particularly in smaller cities and towns. After their start in Mashhad and among bazaaris, they became explicitly anti-system and more violent, marked by clashes with security forces and attacks on banks and government buildings.

That pattern intensified in November 2019, when a sudden hike in gasoline prices triggered a countrywide uprising. The protests were especially notable for the scale of the crackdown: global internet access was shut down for roughly ten days, and Amnesty International later documented more than 300 deaths. Like 2017–2018, these protests were concentrated outside major urban centers and were led primarily by working-class communities rather than the urban middle class.

The 2022–2023 “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in morality-police custody, marked another shift. Protests spread rapidly nationwide and drew in students, teenagers, and middle-class youth in large numbers, particularly on university campuses. While geographically expansive and socially diverse, the movement still mobilized far fewer people at any given moment than 2009. According to Israel’s military intelligence directorate (Aman), at its peak roughly 45,000 people were protesting nationwide at any one time, with more than 500 killed and around 19,000 detained.

Where the Current Protests Fit

The current protests differ in origin but rhyme with earlier economic uprisings. They began with merchants, specifically importers squeezed by currency depreciation, echoing the initial bazaar-linked dynamics of 2017–2018.

From there, protests have spread modestly in parts of Tehran and into other cities, including pockets of unrest—some marked by violence and severe government crackdown—in smaller cities and rural areas.

Measured against the three criteria outlined above:

Geographic scope: The protests have spread beyond Tehran, but remain smaller so far than those of 2017–2018, 2019, or 2022–2023.

Social composition: Merchant participation from the outset is significant, and broader public sympathy is evident, though sustained engagement from organized labor, large numbers of middle class, and ethnic minorities appears limited thus far.

Elite defections: As with every protest cycle since 2009, there have been no meaningful defections from the government or security forces, thus far at least. The closest Iran ever came to this dynamic was during the Green Movement, when many reformist insiders openly sided with protesters.

What Comes Next?

Iran today is marked by deep and widespread discontent, driven above all by a worsening cost-of-living crisis. That creates real potential for escalation. At the same time, history counsels caution. Many protest waves have surged only to recede under repression, exhaustion, or fragmentation.

So far, this movement most closely resembles the 2017–2018 and November 2019 economic protests: decentralized, sparked by economic shocks, geographically dispersed beyond major cities, and met with force. Whether it grows into something larger—or fizzles out—will hinge on whether it broadens across social classes, develops nationwide momentum, and, crucially, produces cracks within the state itself.

Those are the most important signals to watch out for.

But gratitude also points to something deeper, something we often lose sight of in modern life.

We’re all part of an endless stream of giving and receiving.

At the micro level, this shows up in how we rely on our families, friends, colleagues, and communities. But the stream extends far beyond us. Every day, whether or not we notice it, we are in relationship with nature, with society, and with the wider universe.

We are deeply interconnected and interdependent.

Think about all the hands that make a single Thanksgiving meal possible. Beyond the people at your table, there are farmers who grew the food, workers who harvested and packaged it, truck drivers who transported it, store clerks who sold it, and the ecosystems and living beings that made it all possible.

One meal ties us to more lives and more of nature than we probably could ever actually comprehend.

Gratitude is how we reconnect to that flow.

It’s how we remember our place within this larger stream of exchange. Not as isolated individuals, but as participants in a vast network of giving and receiving that sustains us.

When we take things for granted or act selfishly, we don’t just behave poorly; we disconnect. We cut ourselves off from the current that gives life meaning. And that disconnection corrodes us internally. It diminishes our humanity, our empathy, our capacity to see ourselves in others.

This same dynamic applies far beyond our personal lives.

Take foreign policy. If someone dedicates their career to inflicting suffering on people halfway across the world, that act doesn’t remain “over there.” Pushing pain, cruelty, or dehumanization always boomerangs back. It reshapes who we are and slowly imprints itself onto the society we inhabit. The cruelty we inflict outwardly becomes the cruelty we quietly absorb within.

By contrast, when we push for peace, dialogue, reconciliation, and human dignity abroad, we cultivate those same qualities within ourselves and within our own society. What we give is what we ultimately live.

Gratitude teaches us that none of us truly stand outside the stream.

When we are grateful, we participate in that flow of giving and receiving. A current that nourishes connection, empathy, and life itself.

But when we act without gratitude, when we take and hoard or push harm outward, we step out of that stream. And in that isolation, the harm we direct outward becomes harm we inevitably inflict on ourselves.

So today, I’m grateful for the reminder that we are woven into something much larger than ourselves. I’m grateful for the chance to choose how I contribute to that flow.

And I’m grateful for the communities—near and far, past and present—that make my life possible.

Happy Thanksgiving, and may we all stay connected to the stream that sustains us.

Poland’s modern strategy is to lock itself firmly into the orbit of a distant protector. Its security rests on anchoring itself to the United States and on the guarantees provided by NATO, which together offer it a credible shield against Russian power.

In Latin America, generations of movements in Venezuela, Cuba, and many other countries have pushed back against U.S. power not only out of ideology, but out of a long struggle to loosen the grip of a superpower in their immediate neighborhood and over their societies. The drive for autonomy runs deep among many, yet it constantly runs up against economic dependence, security pressures, and political constraints that tie much of the region to Washington. The result is a recurring push and pull between asserting independence and managing the realities of living beside a dominant state.

Iran presents another variation of this dynamic. The Islamic Republic’s quest for deterrence, regional strategic depth, and its own military capabilities is inseparable from its history of foreign intervention. Since the nineteenth century, Iran has been invaded, coerced, and partitioned by outside powers. Russian and British dominance shaped its modern political identity, and the 1953 coup cemented a deep suspicion of dependency on external protectors. The state’s determination to develop its own security architecture is often explained strictly through ideology, but its roots run far deeper. It reflects a long memory of vulnerability and a belief that real security must come from within rather than from any alliance or umbrella, including in a modern context where the United States has repeatedly tried to impose its own security architecture and a lasting hegemony through military force.

Taiwan faces a different but related predicament. Its project of democratic self-rule exists under constant pressure from a vastly more powerful neighbor. At its core, Taiwan’s political identity is shaped by a determination to avoid absorption into a larger power whose vision for the island is fundamentally at odds with its own.

The Palestinians inhabit perhaps the starkest version of this condition. Their national movement is defined by the pursuit of self-determination under overwhelming military domination. Every political strategy, from negotiation to resistance, takes shape within the confines of a landscape controlled by a far stronger state.

These cases differ widely in culture, ideology, and political systems, yet they follow the same basic logic that political theorists and international relations scholars have long identified. States and societies often resist domination by the closest hegemonic power and instead look for safety either by aligning with a more distant patron or by building enough internal strength to deter coercion.

This helps explain why Sikorski’s comment resonates. It captured a universal human impulse: the refusal to be subordinated, even at high cost. Yet that cost is also the reason why many people ultimately would rather accept the orbit of the very hegemon they confront. In Iran, Poland, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Cuba, the calculus is often painful. Autonomy demands sacrifice, and dependence offers tradeoffs.

At the heart of Lavrov’s trip is the deepening Iran-Russia partnership, cemented by the landmark 20-year "Strategic Cooperation Treaty" signed this January. This legally binding pact—unlike Iran’s 25-year agreement with China—outlines broad economic, technological, and security cooperation, including a mutual non-aggression clause ensuring that neither side will aid an adversary’s attack on the other.

But beyond the technicalities, this treaty signals something more profound: a shared vision for a multipolar world order, in which the US-led system is steadily being challenged.

Lavrov’s Visit to Tehran

Moscow framed today’s visit in terms of “mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation”, particularly in energy and transportation projects. But the bigger story is the potential emerging alignment between Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing, especially as Iran reinforces its opposition to direct talks with the U.S. under pressure.

Araghchi made this clear during the press conference with Lavrov:

“We do not negotiate under pressure, threats, or sanctions. Therefore, the possibility of direct negotiations between us and the United States will not exist as long as maximum pressure is applied.”

Araghchi added:

“We briefed Mr. Lavrov on the discussions we had with the three European countries. We are moving forward in the nuclear issue in cooperation and coordination with Russia and China.”

For Russia, Iran’s firm stance is seemingly a welcome development. Lavrov reiterated:

“We believe there is still diplomatic potential [for the JCPOA], and this capacity should be utilized without threats, pretexts, or the use of force. We will assist in finding a solution to this crisis.”

This comes as Russia’s ambassador to Iran, Alexey Dedov, emphasized in a recent interview with ISNA that Moscow sees the P5+1 framework as still valid—despite widespread acknowledgment that the 2015 nuclear deal is all but dead.

According to Dedov:

“We have not been and will not be mediators in this regard. We are directly involved in this process… We support maintaining this P5+1 framework, with Iran on one side and the other members on the other.”

Moreover, Dedov accused the West of trying to exclude Russia and China from negotiations, stating:

“Without Russia and China, such negotiations will never achieve their goal and will not be effective.”

Can Iran Trust Russia? Fears of a Grand Bargain with the US

While the Tehran-Moscow partnership appears stronger than ever, some in Iran remain wary that Russia could cut a separate deal with the US at Iran’s expense. Khabar Online captured this anxiety, warning:

“Just as the fragile peace of Versailles triggered World War II, today these secret conferences and decisions for the world may be the beginning of the third war! Even Africa is being divided between Russia and America—let alone the region!”

The outlet added:

“Lavrov is coming to Iran to say: Negotiate, and do not even talk about nuclear weapons! Now, in this concept, the trip of the Emir of Qatar to Tehran should also be examined. The world is undergoing division and transition, and Tehran must claim its share; otherwise, it will have lost the game in the region to the Arabs (especially Riyadh) and Turkey!”

Ultimately, Lavrov’s visit underscores Iran’s vulnerability to Moscow’s shifting priorities. While the 20-year strategic treaty provides a framework for long-term cooperation, the real question is whether Iran will remain a junior partner in Moscow’s broader geopolitical game—or if Tehran will successfully leverage this partnership to solidify its own standing in a changing world order.

For now, the message from Tehran is clear:

Iran won’t negotiate with Washington under pressure, but it will deepen its ties with Moscow and Beijing, even as some in Iran fear that this alliance might not be as ironclad as it seems.

In this issue, I delve into three critical stories:

1. Ali Akbar Salehi on Khamenei’s Remarks Drawing a Red Line on U.S. Talks

   Insights from Iran’s former foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s recent comments ruling out negotiations with the U.S., as well as his view on America’s global ambitions.
   

2. Russia’s Ambassador Speaks: Moscow Eyes a Role in Nuclear Talks

   An interview with Russia’s ambassador to Iran sheds light on Moscow’s ambitions to play a role in any future nuclear negotiations.
   

3. Iran’s Unified Response to Trump: From Pezeshkian to Parliament

   How Iran’s political establishment, from the reformist Pezeshkian administration to the conservative-dominated parliament, has rallied behind a firm stance in the face of escalating U.S. pressure.

1. Ali Akbar Salehi on Khamenei’s Remarks Drawing a Red Line on U.S. Talks

   
   Ali Akbar Salehi, a former Iranian foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator, has provided a rare glimpse into how Iran’s leadership interprets U.S. intentions and global strategy—especially under Trump.

   

   Writing in Jamaran, a reformist-leaning outlet, his analysis provides a window into Iran’s potential approach to diplomacy and the thinking behind Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s recent declaration ruling out negotiations with the U.S.
   

   Salehi on Khamenei’s Dual Messaging:
   

   “The statements of the Supreme Leader always address two audiences: one is the domestic audience, for whom his words serve as a ‘reminder,’ and the other is the foreign audience, for whom his words serve as a ‘warning and caution.’ Certainly, our friends in foreign policy are aware of this subtle point.”

   This observation is significant in light of Khamenei’s recent remarks dismissing the possibility of talks with the U.S. Salehi implies that while the Supreme Leader’s rhetoric may appear uncompromising, it is carefully calibrated to reinforce Iran’s red lines without entirely closing the door to future diplomatic opportunities.
   

   Salehi on U.S. Ambitions Under Trump:
   

   Salehi’s article delves into what he sees as the core pillars of U.S. strategy under Trump, particularly in the Middle East and vis-à-vis Iran. He outlines several key objectives:

Read more

Today, February 7, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei delivered a rejection of negotiations with the United States today, reinforcing his long-standing distrust of Washington. His rhetoric appeared uncompromising: " Negotiating with such a government [America] should not be done. Negotiation with them is neither wise, nor intelligent, nor honorable."

These words fit a familiar pattern in Khamenei’s approach to U.S.-Iran relations—framing negotiations as futile and casting any diplomatic engagement as leading to capitulation.

But if history has shown us anything, it’s that Khamenei’s red lines are not always absolute. Their strictness depends on the political context, strategic considerations, and his own desire to maintain plausible deniability.

The Flexibility of Khamenei’s Red Lines

A case in point: In February 2013, Khamenei issued nearly identical remarks, dismissing negotiations with the U.S. as useless and impossible under pressure. Yet at that very moment, Iran was engaged in secret talks with American officials in Oman—talks that ultimately paved the way for the 2015 nuclear deal.

This reveals a key pattern in Khamenei’s leadership: his categorical statements do not always mean negotiations are off the table. Instead, they serve to shield him from political fallout. He can allow negotiations to proceed while publicly disavowing them, ensuring that if things go wrong, responsibility falls elsewhere.

Khamenei’s Strategy

This dynamic matters now more than ever. Khamenei’s speech today diminishes the space for the reformist President Pezeshkian and his team, who have signaled an openness to diplomacy. If they pursue talks with the U.S., they do so under a cloud of explicit Supreme Leader disapproval. Khamenei would retain a political out if things go sideways: he can claim he always opposed it, warned against trusting the U.S., and overall shift blame.

This is exactly what he did with the 2015 nuclear deal and Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from it. While he ultimately allowed the negotiations to proceed, he maintained a careful distance, repeatedly emphasizing his distrust of the U.S. and framing the agreement as a test of American credibility rather than a strategic shift for Iran. When Trump reneged on the deal in 2018, Khamenei was able to say his skepticism had been vindicated—that his red lines had not been met and that those who trusted Washington had been proven wrong. By doing so, he shielded himself from domestic backlash, ensuring that responsibility for the deal’s failure fell on Rouhani and his negotiators rather than on himself.

With Pezeshkian, the same pattern may emerge. If diplomacy collapses, Khamenei can once again declare that he never endorsed negotiations in the first place. But if talks succeed, he still benefits—either by extracting concessions from the U.S. or by reinforcing the narrative that Iran, under his leadership, navigated another round of Western pressure without making unacceptable compromises.

The October Snapback and a Dwindling Diplomatic Window

If there’s no breakthrough before the October snapback deadline, the Iran nuclear crisis will become infinitely harder to resolve diplomatically. There’s no viable military solution, and once UN sanctions are reinstated, the ability to offer Iran meaningful sanctions relief—Washington’s primary leverage—essentially disappears.

At that point, Iran’s likely response is clear. Tehran has already threatened to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and alter its "nuclear doctrine" if snapback occurs. This could mark the beginning of Iran openly moving toward nuclear weaponization, despite the consequences of greater international isolation.

Some in Washington and Tel Aviv will argue that if diplomacy fails, military action must be the answer. But Trump himself has signaled an awareness of the risks. A war with Iran would be a catastrophic disaster for the U.S., with strategic consequences likely far worse than an Iranian nuclear weapon.

And ironically, military action would all but guarantee Iran gets the bomb. If attacked, Tehran would have every incentive to accelerate weaponization.

The Bottom Line

Khamenei’s remarks today set the stage for escalating tensions. But they don’t necessarily rule out negotiations down the line. If Pezeshkian and his team push for talks, Khamenei has his escape hatch ready—dismissing diplomacy if it fails while reaping its benefits if it succeeds.

Khamenei also signaled that Iran would respond to U.S. actions in kind, warning that any hostile move from Washington would be met with a hostile response. If this dynamic holds, it risks fueling a cycle of rapid escalation—especially as Iran’s nuclear program continues to advance at full speed.

The challenge now is to break this dangerous pattern before it spirals out of control. What’s needed instead is a tit-for-tat cycle of de-escalation—reciprocal concessions and confidence-building measures that can rebuild trust and lay the groundwork for serious negotiations and a broader deal. That path remains open, but only if both sides resist the temptation to escalate and instead create the conditions for diplomacy to succeed.

In my latest articles, I lay out two starkly different paths Trump could take.

• In The American Conservative, I argue that Trump has a unique opportunity to break the cycle with a legacy-defining deal that makes America safer and avoids a disastrous war.

• In the International Policy Journal, I expose the way Washington’s hawks are steering him toward confrontation, framing escalation as both inevitable and desirable. If Trump follows their lead, he risks entangling the U.S. in yet another costly and unwinnable conflict.

Meanwhile, this past week has been eventful in U.S.-Iran relations. President Trump signed a presidential memorandum—notably not an executive order—just before meeting Netanyahu at the White House. This directive instructed U.S. agencies to prepare for new sanctions on Iran, marking a kind of return to Trump's "maximum pressure" strategy (which in reality never stopped under Biden).

But Trump’s remarks during the signing were just as revealing as the document itself. He repeatedly emphasized that he hopes these measures "will hardly have to be used at all." He made it clear that his primary goal is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and signaled openness to meeting with his Iranian counterpart. This is a crucial point: Trump is keeping the door to diplomacy open, not slamming it shut.

Signs from Tehran: More Than Just Pezeshkian

While much focus regarding Iran is on the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, recent statements from Ali Akbar Ahmadian, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, may be even more significant. A former IRGC commander, Ahmadian leads a body that includes figures from across Iran’s political and military spectrum.

His latest remarks suggest a strategic opening for negotiations. He invoked Quranic and religious justifications for diplomacy, rejecting the notion that dialogue and steadfastness are mutually exclusive:

“Some people place dialogue and negotiation in opposition to steadfastness. This is a mistaken perception. Negotiation can even be conducted with disbelievers.”

Ahmadian also laid out a religious and strategic rationale for negotiations, arguing that Iran’s leadership must distinguish between when to compromise and when to stand firm:

"The lives of our Imams are full of examples of when to compromise and when not to. If we are stubborn in situations where we should compromise, we will suffer harm. Likewise, in situations where we should stand firm, if we compromise, it is a mistake."

His remarks weren’t just theoretical. In defending Iran’s decision not to escalate against Israel in a "True Promise 3" operation, Ahmadian rejected the notion that Iran and Israel are at war, cautioning against framing their conflict in such terms:

"There is a great effort to erase the issue of resistance and claim that there has been a war between Iran and Israel for forty years.

War and resistance are different.

First, our confrontation with the Zionist regime has not been a war; even now, we do not have a war in that sense.

They took an action, and we took an action in response. This is not the concept of war. Anyone who understands war knows that this is not war."

This is a significant development. Ahmadian’s remarks suggest that Iran’s openness to diplomacy is not just limited to Pezeshkian's administration but extends to the military and IRGC leadership. With that said, he also reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to "resistance," making it clear that while war could happen, it is not Iran’s goal.

What Would a Trump-Iran Negotiation Look Like?

Despite the return of maximum pressure, the broader behavior of the Trump administration does not suggest that negotiations are impossible. If talks happen, they will almost certainly begin with the nuclear issue—though regional matters and Iran’s missile program could also come up.

On regional issues, the relative de-escalation—ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, the halt in attacks in Iraq and Yemen—actually creates conditions that favor diplomacy. While regional concerns may be raised, they are unlikely to derail a nuclear deal.

On missiles, Iran will likely insist on not extending their range while refusing to negotiate on the program itself.

But the real question is Trump’s demands.

Will he settle for something like the 2015 Obama-era nuclear—or will he push for more?

Ultimately, he wants a "new" deal distinct from Obama's, one that he can market as a political victory over both Obama and Biden.

Deal or No Deal?

At this stage, I believe that the probability of a deal is higher than the probability of no deal.

If no deal is reached, the key question will be: To what level will tensions escalate?

From the beginning, analysts—including myself—warned that Israel was embarking on an unwinnable war. Hamas, entrenched within the local population, driven by genuine grievances, and adept at guerrilla warfare, was always positioned to outlast the Israeli assault. Despite the billions of dollars in aid and cutting-edge military technology provided to Israel by the United States and its allies, the outcome was predictable.

An Unequal Fight in an Unequal War

Consider the stark asymmetry: a regional power, armed with the latest in military technology, supported politically, militarily, and financially by the world’s superpower, faced off against a small organization in a confined and besieged strip of land. Over the past 15 months, Israel deployed its F-35 fighter jets, reconnaissance drones, and missiles against an enemy equipped primarily with RPGs, Kalashnikovs, and homemade explosives. The result? Over 20,000 Palestinian children killed, entire neighborhoods flattened, and civilian infrastructure obliterated—all for Israel to return to square one.

Despite Israel’s technological and financial advantages, it was Hamas that emerged from the rubble with its demands met. The basis of the ceasefire agreement mirrors the proposal first presented by the United States in May—a proposal rejected by Prime Minister Netanyahu at the time. In the end, Netanyahu was forced to swallow a bitter pill, agreeing to halt the war, withdraw from Gaza, and engage in a prisoner exchange that heavily favors Hamas.

The Cost of Hubris

Netanyahu’s unfulfilled promises stand as stark reminders of Israel’s failure:

• Gaza’s population remains un-displaced.

• The north and south of Gaza are not separated.

• Hamas was not defeated.

• Hostages were not freed without significant concessions.

These failures are not just tactical but strategic. Israel’s global reputation has been tarnished, its alliance with the United States strained, and its military deterrence weakened.

Notably, a review of Israeli outlets and analysts reveals a broad consensus: this war is being widely regarded as a decisive loss for Israel. Many point to the failure to achieve any meaningful objectives, compounded by the bitter irony that the ceasefire agreement mirrors proposals that could have been accepted months earlier—saving lives among the hostages and Israeli soldiers.

What Hamas Gained

The ceasefire deal underscores the extent of Hamas’ victory:

• The release of over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, including hundreds serving life sentences.

• Comprehensive withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza.

• An agreement on humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts.

• Defacto continued military and security control over Gaza, with a reorganized and reinvigorated leadership.

As General Giora Eiland, a former head of Israel’s National Security Council, acknowledged: "Hamas succeeded in achieving its own goal of staying in power while preventing Israel from achieving any of its objectives."

A War That Should Never Have Been

This war was a tragedy on a scale that will haunt both sides for generations. Yet it serves as a powerful reminder that military might cannot resolve political conflicts rooted in deep-seated grievances and historical injustices. For Israel, the war has left behind a fractured society, strained alliances, and emboldened adversaries. For Palestinians, the cost was staggering, with lives lost, communities destroyed, and trauma inflicted on a massive scale.

In the end, the Gaza ceasefire is not just an end to hostilities but a stark indictment of the long-standing strategies that led to this devastating war.

Ultimately, there can be no lasting peace in the region without addressing the root causes of the conflict: the Israeli occupation and the denial of basic rights and dignity to the Palestinian people. Palestinians deserve a political horizon—a future where they are free from occupation, able to govern themselves, and live with dignity and equality.

This requires bold and decisive U.S. diplomacy, not to perpetuate the status quo but to chart a new course toward lasting peace. America must leverage its influence to end the occupation and support a fair, just, and sustainable solution that respects the rights of both peoples. Anything less is to condemn the region to repeat this tragedy again and again.

Over the past few years, meditation has profoundly shaped my life. Yet, despite including it in my Substack’s description, I haven’t written a single post about it!

Over the holiday break, I decided it was time to change that. In this post, I’ll share why mindfulness meditation has been so meaningful and practically beneficial for me. I aim to make this post the first of many, where I share the teachings and techniques that have helped me—and perhaps inspire others to explore mindfulness too.

My aim here will be to provide a general overview of mindfulness meditation—what it is and its benefits—by drawing on three books that have been particularly insightful for me: Why Buddhism Is True by Robert Wright, Altered Traits by Daniel Goleman and Richard Davidson, and Science and Spiritual Practices by Rupert Sheldrake. Each offers valuable perspectives, blending science, philosophy and spirituality to illuminate the benefits of meditation.

My introduction to meditation and mindfulness actually first began with the popular app Calm, which offers guided meditations and training courses. I highly recommend it as a great starting point for anyone new to this practice.

From there, I deepened my practice by delving into books and had the great fortune of learning from a knowledgeable and experienced mentor who has maintained a regular meditation practice for decades.

Before diving in, it’s important to highlight a key lesson I’ve learned: While understanding mindfulness meditation “intellectually” is necessary, the real transformation comes from regular, consistent practice. Daily meditation, whenever possible, combined with “applied mindfulness”—actively cultivating present-moment awareness throughout the day—is essential for truly integrating these practices into your life.

With that said, what is meditation? How can it truly benefit someone living in the modern world?

Altered Traits provides superb answers to these questions. Written by Daniel Goleman, a Harvard-trained psychologist and longtime science journalist for The New York Times, and Richard Davidson, a neuroscientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison with a PhD from Harvard, the book explores the lasting effects of meditation on the mind and body.

Drawing on decades of empirical research, Goleman and Davidson demonstrate how meditation reduces stress, sharpens focus, and rewires the brain for greater resilience and compassion. With their combined expertise, they present a compelling, science-backed case for the transformative power of meditation.

They have one passage that I think very effectively and concisely explains the process and experience of mindfulness meditation. During this practice, you sit still, focus on a focal point (like the breath), and observe your thoughts, feelings, and physical sensations, with curiosity and without judgement.

They write:

'At first, the flow of thoughts rushes like a waterfall, which sometimes discourages beginners, who feel their mind is out of control. Actually, the sense of a torrent of thoughts seems to be due to paying close attention to our natural state, which Asian cultures dub "monkey mind," for its wildly frenetic randomness. As our concentration strengthens, wandering thoughts subside rather than pulling us down some back alley of the mind.

The stream of thought flows more slowly, like a river—and finally rests in the stillness of a lake, as an ancient metaphor for settling the mind in meditation practice tells us.

Sustained focus, the manual notes, brings the first major sign of progress, "access concentration," where attention stays fixed on the chosen target without wandering off.

With this level of concentration come feelings of delight and calm, and, sometimes, sensory phenomena like flashes of light or a sense of bodily lightness.

With mindfulness, the meditator simply notes without reactivity whatever comes into mind, such as thoughts or sensory impressions like sounds—and lets them go. The operative word here is let go. If we think much of anything about what just arose, or let it trigger any reactivity at all, we have lost our mindful stance—unless that reaction or thought in turn becomes the object of mindfulness.'

They further explain about the 'default mode’ of our brain, explaining:

'The default mode turns on while we chill out, not doing anything that requires focus and effort; it blossoms during the mind’s downtime. Conversely, as we focus on some challenge, like grappling with what’s happened to your Wi-Fi signal, the default mode quiets.

With nothing much else to capture our attention, our mind wanders, very often to what’s troubling us—a root cause of everyday angst. Managing attention, as we saw in the previous chapter, is an essential ingredient of every variety of meditation. When we become lost in thoughts during meditation, we’ve fallen into the default mode and its wandering mind.'

They summarize the definition of mindfulness meditation as follows:

'In the mechanics of meditation, focusing on one thing only means also noticing when your mind wanders off so you can bring it back—and so concentration and mindfulness go hand in hand.

Perhaps the most widely quoted definition [of mindfulness meditation] comes from Jon Kabat-Zinn: “The awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of experience.”

I have found the general practice of mindfulness meditation, as they describe, to be incredibly beneficial. What is most fascinating is that, paradoxically, it offers a kind of 'control' over our thoughts, feelings, and physical sensations—not by forcing them away, but by 'letting them go.' This means observing without attachment or identification, free from judgment or the need to label thoughts and feelings as good or bad, and without the desire or urge to make them disappear.

In this regard, Robert Wright explains in his invaluable book Why Buddhism Is True:

'Seeing things in these terms helps illuminate a core paradox of Buddhist meditation practice: accepting that your self isn’t in control, and may in some sense not even exist, can put your self—or something like it—in control.'"

Wright, a Princeton-educated author, has taught at Princeton, the University of Pennsylvania, and Union Theological Seminary and is renowned for his work on science, psychology, and philosophy.

In Why Buddhism Is True, he presents a secular, science-backed exploration of traditional Buddhist meditation practices and philosophies, drawing on evolutionary psychology and neuroscience to highlight their benefits in reducing suffering, easing anxiety, and fostering well-being.

I found Wright's scientific insights into how the human mind works both compelling and deeply illuminating. He explains how our feelings and thoughts often function as illusions—and how shifting our perspective can dispel these illusions.

Wright draws on evolutionary biology to show that the modes of thinking and emotions ingrained in us were shaped for survival, not happiness, and often fail to serve our interests in the modern world.

We find ourselves on a “hedonistic treadmill,” constantly chasing fleeting happiness and pleasure while trying to push away “negative” feelings and states of mind, without realizing that all emotions are inherently transient.

As Wright explains:

'Feeling arose as a proxy for thinking about what we want. Feelings encode judgments about things in the environment, mostly about ourselves. Feelings are illusory because they don’t necessarily lead to things that are good or bad, they are wrong. Eating too much of what feels good is not good for us, like powdered donuts.'

He elaborates with examples like road rage, noting:

'There are quite a few feelings like this—feelings that, back when they entered our lineage, served our ancestors’ interests but that don’t always serve our interests now. Take road rage. The desire to punish people who treat you unfairly or show you disrespect is deeply human. And admit it: though there’s something unpleasant about being made angry, there’s something pleasing about the feeling of anger itself—the feeling that you’re rightfully enraged. The Buddha said anger has a "poisoned root and honeyed tip."'

Underlying these tendencies, Wright identifies what he calls 'the happiness delusion.' As he writes,

'As the Buddha emphasized, our ongoing attempts to feel better tend to involve an overestimation of how long "better" is going to last. What’s more, when "better" ends, it can be followed by "worse"—an unsettled feeling, a thirst for more. Long before psychologists were describing the hedonic treadmill, the Buddha saw it.'"

In sum, Wright compellingly explains that simply noticing your mind has wandered reveals a profound truth: you are not fully in control of your thoughts. Grappling with this realization—that your thoughts arise on their own—becomes the first step toward regaining control. By cultivating mindfulness, you can better discern which thoughts are healthy and worth holding onto, and which ones should be let go. This, ultimately, is the goal.

Indeed, what mindfulness meditation has ultimately afforded me is a transformation in how I relate to my consciousness and its contents—my thoughts and feelings. As Wright puts it, “Those are not your ‘self’; contemplate them rather than engaging with them.” This shift in perspective can be profoundly liberating.

This brings me to Rupert Sheldrake’s Science and Spiritual Practices. Sheldrake, a British biologist educated at Harvard and Cambridge, has conducted fascinating research into the nature of consciousness. Sheldrake’s book stands apart from those by Wright and Goleman and Davidson. While it remains grounded in science and the scientific method, Sheldrake takes an explicit “spiritualist” approach, arguing for a metaphysical dimension to both consciousness and existence.

Growing up secular and deeply rooted in a scientific worldview, I was surprised by how insightful many of Sheldrake’s ideas were for me. His work has opened the door to learning from diverse modes of inquiry, including those drawn from religious traditions across cultures.

Indeed, Sheldrake highlights in Science and Spiritual Practices that medidation and similar practices exist in virtually every religion but emphasizes they can be practiced in a strictly secular way, writing,

'Although techniques of meditation grew up within Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Sikh, and other religious traditions, meditation can also be practiced in a secular spirit, without any religious framework.'

Similar to the other books, Sheldrake’s chapter on meditation in Science and Spiritual Practices offers valuable insights into the benefits of the practice.

He writes,

'One of the effects of meditation is an increase in self-knowledge, a greater awareness of the workings of our minds. We might assume that we are fully in charge of our thoughts and our attention. But even a slight acquaintance with the practice of meditation makes us aware of how many thoughts insert themselves into our minds and how little control we have over this process.'

He then gives a great overview of the increasing scientific consensus on the benefits of meditation (all the sources are in his book), explaining,

'In the modern Western world it is commonly used in this nonreligious form, either through various derivatives of Hindu meditation, such as Transcendental Meditation, or of Buddhist meditation, as in mindfulness meditation.' He emphasizes its widespread adoption, noting that mindfulness techniques are now taught in schools, practiced by business professionals, armed forces, prisoners, and even politicians.

He adds,

'Dozens of British members of parliament have learned mindfulness techniques and meet weekly to meditate together.'

Sheldrake underscores:

'Because of its therapeutic benefits, mindfulness meditation is now recommended within the British National Health Service for people suffering from mild or moderate depression, because it has been found to be as effective, and cheaper, than long courses of antidepressant drugs.' In the U.S., Jon Kabat-Zinn’s work at the University of Massachusetts Medical School has led to the development of 'mindfulness-based stress reduction,' a training regime now used in hundreds of clinics and health centers.

Sheldrake says of the outcome of extensive scientific research:

'Since the 1960s, scientific journals have published thousands of papers on the effects of meditation on health and well-being.' These studies show a range of benefits, including reductions in anxiety, blood pressure, and insomnia; relief from conditions like asthma, ulcers, and cardiac arrhythmias; and improved fertility and pain management. Meditation has also shown remarkable results for schoolchildren, college students, and U.S. military veterans, significantly improving social competence, well-being, and symptoms of post-traumatic stress.

He adds,

'Meditation tends to reduce ruminations, obsessions, cravings, fantasies, and being lost in thought. Not surprisingly, these changes in the activity of the mind are associated with changes in the activity of the brain.'

All in all, these three books—Why Buddhism Is True by Robert Wright, Altered Traits by Daniel Goleman and Richard Davidson, and Science and Spiritual Practices by Rupert Sheldrake—offer a compelling case for the transformative power of meditation.

Bridging ancient wisdom with modern science, they show how meditation can reshape the mind, enhance well-being, and reduce stress. I highly recommend reading these works and incorporating mindfulness into your life—the benefits of greater self-awareness, inner peace, and improved health are truly worth it.

In this issue, I explore three key stories:

1. An Iranian newspaper’s analysis of the costs of the country’s missile attacks targeting Israel, challenging recent claims by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

2. Veteran Iranian diplomat Hamid Aboutalebi’s commentary on Elon Musk’s meeting with Iran's UN ambassador, unpacking its implications for U.S.-Iran relations.

3. IRGC General Mohammad Jafar Asadi’s perspective on Iran’s regional policies.

   

   ---

1. Narrative War over Cost of Iran’s Missiles

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently claimed that Iran spent $2.3 billion on its missile attacks on Iran.

An analysis in the Iranian Farhikhtegan newspaper challenges this figure, highlighting the information warfare between the two countries and shedding light into the costs of Iran’s missile and drone programs.

Key Insights

• Iranian experts estimate the total cost of both Promise of Truth operations at $120.45 million—a fraction of Netanyahu’s claim.

• Iran's decentralized missile production network, utilizing semi-industrial methods, has allegedly drastically reduced costs.

Translated excerpts from the Farhikhtegan story:

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It’s hard to imagine this encounter wasn’t coordinated with Donald Trump, reflecting a deliberate effort by the president-elect to open a direct communication channel with Tehran.

The focus of the meeting—defusing tensions—comes at a critical moment. U.S.-Iran relations have been frozen since Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018, imposed harsh sanctions, and ordered the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassim Soleimani in 2020.

Against this backdrop, the Musk-Iravani meeting marks the first potential opening for dialogue in years.

However, the stakes are extraordinarily high. The Middle East teeters on the brink of an all-out regional war, with Israel already engaged in intense conflicts with Iranian-backed groups Hamas and Hezbollah. Trump’s strong support for Israel—reflecting in his choices for his national security team—adds further complexity, as his policies could increase the risk of escalation between Israel and Iran once he assumes office.

Musk’s involvement as a negotiator signals a pragmatic turn in Trump’s approach. But pragmatism alone won’t be enough. Successful diplomacy requires more than high-profile meetings—it demands technical expertise, well-defined working groups, and negotiators committed to good-faith discussions on nuclear and regional issues. Without these elements, the process risks faltering before it begins.

This meeting also raises questions about Trump’s broader strategy. Is this an attempt to preemptively manage tensions and avoid a costly conflict, or is it simply a gesture to gauge Iran’s approach with limited follow-through? Musk’s role is intriguing, but substantive progress will depend on whether this backchannel evolves into a structured and sustained diplomatic effort.

For now, the Musk-Iravani meeting is a significant development to watch closely. It represents both a potential turning point and a test of whether unconventional approaches can yield meaningful results in a Middle East on the edge of total war.

However, Netanyahu's broader approach to the conflict over the past year suggests that this moment will not lead to a resolution. Recently, he even reframed the conflict, casting it in religious and messianic terms by renaming it from the "Swords of Iron" to the "Resurrection War." This shift reinforces that his desire is not for peace but for escalation, as he appears to be doubling down on a prolonged conflict and gambling on a potential Trump victory in the 2024 U.S. election. There are numerous indications that in Netanyahu's calculation, such an outcome would grant him greater U.S. backing, allowing him pursuit his quixotic aim to reshape the region in Israel’s favor.

At present, the ball is firmly in Netanyahu’s court. The key question is how Israeli politics will evolve in the coming weeks. His recent tactical wins over Hezbollah gave him some much-needed political breathing room, but Iran’s recent missile attacks and Hezbollah’s continued operations have reintroduced significant pressure. If the opposition to Netanyahu regains momentum and Israelis take to the streets again in protest for a hostage deal, it may force him into a deal. Yet, Netanyahu's political survival ultimately depend on how far he can push the “winning” narrative while keeping his fierce domestic opposition at bay.

One of the most critical factors that could influence Netanyahu’s next move is the fate of the Israeli hostages. It is believed that only Sinwar and a few senior Hamas commanders knew their exact location. With Sinwar’s death, that knowledge may be lost, raising the stakes for Netanyahu. If Netanyahu manages to rescue the hostages without negotiating a ceasefire, he will likely strengthen his political position. On the other hand, if he refuses to negotiate, and the hostages are killed, it could deal a severe blow to his standing and increase public pressure on his government.

The death of Sinwar could also have broader implications for Israel’s northern front, particularly with Hezbollah. Buoyed by the success in Gaza, Netanyahu may attempt to apply a similar military approach in Lebanon, risking further escalation in the region.

Finally, Sinwar’s death raises questions about the future of Hamas’s leadership. Who will step in to lead the group—someone from within Gaza’s military ranks, or the political wing operating outside the enclave? Someone close to Iran, like Sinwar and his predecessor Haniyeh, or someone more critical of Iranian influence, like Khaled Meshal. The successor Hamas chooses will have significant consequences for the organization’s strategy and future.

In the broader picture, Sinwar’s death does not signal the end of the regional conflict; if anything, it likely will perpetuate and potentially intensify it.

1. Regional Diplomatic Flurry

Today, Iranian media reported that Sultan Haitham of Oman made a rare direct call to Iran's President Pezeshkian, signaling possible broader US diplomatic efforts, though details are scarce. Oman, a key mediator between the US and Iran, often facilitates such diplomatic overtures.

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In the past few weeks, I’ve had the opportunity to delve into key issues that are shaping the Middle East for several outlets, and I’m excited to share some of my latest articles with you.

First, in The Guardian, I argued that despite Israel’s recent tactical successes, including the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, the pager/walkie-talkie explosions, and the killing of Hezbollah's elite Radwan commanders, Israel is strategically losing the war. Why? Because it’s a conventional power fighting unconventional guerrilla forces—groups driven by nationalist and religious motivations, deeply embedded within their populations. History shows that such movements cannot be defeated through military means. If Israel seeks long-term security, it must address the core issue: the Palestinian conflict. Without offering Palestinians a political horizon for statehood, military solutions will continue to fall short.

Next, I wrote for The Stimson Center about a significant development within Iran’s opposition politics. I focused on a recent letter from Faezeh Hashemi, an outspoken dissident and the daughter of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, sent from inside Evin Prison. Her letter sparked intense debates in Iran as it criticized undemocratic factions within the opposition that, in her view, seek to perpetuate repressive systems. The range of reactions to her letter reveals much about the complex dynamics of opposition politics in Iran today.

Finally, just after the UNGA in September, I published a piece in Foreign Policy highlighting the diplomatic push by Iran's new reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian. His outreach was notable, with a clear desire for broader talks beyond just the nuclear issue. While the assassination of Nasrallah and Iran’s subsequent missile strike on Israel have made diplomacy seem more distant now, I argued that after the US election, Pezeshkian’s diplomatic overtures will deserve serious attention. Testing his willingness for broader engagement could prove to be a crucial step toward de-escalation.

I invite you to read these articles and share your thoughts on how these events might shape the region moving forward. Thank you for your continued support!

Warmly,

Sina